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I.

Introduction
In fiscal year 2017, the federal government contracted with nearly 3.5 million different

individuals and awarded over 350 billion dollars in contracts.1 Specifically, the government
reserves and allocates substantial sums of contract dollars for small businesses run by historically
disadvantaged individuals such as minorities and women.2 Unfortunately, individuals (referred to
as “white collar criminals”3) steal hundreds of millions of dollars annually from various
government programs by means of fraud, embezzlement or improper disbursement.4 Sentencing
white collar criminals implicates challenging issues including how to punish behavior not
immediately recognizable as criminal because fraud crimes often implicate amorphous victims.5
Without reforming the federal United States Sentencing Guidelines’ (the “Guidelines”) Comment
Application Notes (“the Notes”), the small business procurement market of individual minority
and women business owners will continue to suffer harm.6
The circuit courts of appeals use two major approaches to calculate loss when criminals
steal money intended for minority or women businesses.7 As a result, a circuit split exists where
several circuit courts apply the general loss rule, while others apply the government benefits

1

USASPENDING.GOV, https://www.usaspending.gov (LAST VISITED SEPT. 14, 2017).
See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2016); 49 C.F.R. § 26.1–.15 (2014).
3
Peter J. Henning, Is Deterrence Relevant in Sentencing White Collar Criminals?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 34 (2015)
(defining “white collar criminals” as unique because they share several distinct characteristics; they are typically
white, older, and better educated with no prior criminal history).
4
See Rick Moran, SBA Inspector General Uncovers Fraud in the 8(a) Program, ASSOCIATION OF PROCUREMENT
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS (2017), http://www.aptac-us.org/news/sba-ig-uncovers-8a-fraud/; see also
Michelle McVicker, The Real Cost of DBE Fraud, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 1, 8 (2016) (stating the largest DBE fraud
in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled 136 million dollars over 15 years).
5
Id. at 34 (defining “amorphous victims” as “the market” or a faceless organization that does not suffer in the same
way one who is robbed or assaulted would); see Christopher C. Reese, Note, A New Sentencing Blueprint: The Third
Circuit Allows Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud Convictions to Be Offset by Construction Contract
Performance in United States v. Nagle, 61 VILL. L. REV. 681–88 (2016).
6
Henning, supra, at 34 (noting that white collar crime and procurement fraud implicates unseen harm).
7 See e.g., United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 602 (5th Cir 2016) (applying the general loss rule); United States v.
Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying the special government benefits rule).
2

special loss rule.8 The decision as to whether to apply the general rule or the government benefits
rule matters because an individual can defraud the government in one circuit, but serve
considerably more or less time in a different circuit for committing the same offense.9 For
example, under the general loss rule, small business owner A that defrauds the government of one
million dollars who uses some of the funds for legitimate purposes will have the legitimate services
subtracted from the one million dollars awarded. Importantly, owner A will see a reduction in
prison time because A performed on the contract to some extent. In contrast, if B defrauds the
government of one million dollars deemed to be “government benefits,” B will owe the entire one
million dollars in restitution and be sentenced as such regardless of any legitimate services
provided. Therefore, dramatic discrepancies in federal sentencing breed unfairness, injustice, and
reinforce the need for uniform sentencing policy in fraud cases involving “affirmative action”
programs.
In this comment, I will argue that the United States Sentencing Commission (“The
Commission”) should amend the Guidelines for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to
clarify that an individual who steals from “affirmative action” programs will be liable for every
dollar received from the government without any reduction for legitimate services rendered.10 In
the alternative, to avoid varying interpretations concerning whether the Small Business
Administration 8(a) (SBA) and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) programs are
“government benefits,”11 the Commission should add the following text to the enumerated list of
examples included in the 3(F)(ii) special rules: government benefits include “Small Business
Administration and Disadvantaged Business Enterprise grants or any type of federal program

8

See id.
See USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii); see also id. n.3(A).
10
See id. §2B1.1(b)(1).
11
See id.
9

payments with the aim of giving exclusive opportunities to women businesses, minority
businesses, or businesses run by any class of disadvantaged persons.”

Lastly, until the

Commission revises the Notes, the Supreme Court should hold that SBA 8(a) contracts and DBE
grants should be considered “government benefits” within the meaning of 3(F) for federal
sentencing purposes.
First, this comment will introduce the Commission, the Guideline comments language, and
provide a detailed explanation of the relevant rules provisions. Second, this comment will explore
the history of the Commission, the specific comment rules at issue, and the purpose of SBA 8(a)
and DBE programs. Third, this comment will explain the various circuit courts of appeals
decisions regarding the Note application. Fourth, this comment will evaluate both sides of the
circuit split and argue that affirmative action procurement programs should be considered
“government benefits.” Finally, this comment will argue that the Commission should amend
section 2B1.1(b)(1) to explicitly state that “affirmative action” government contracts programs
belong under the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii).

II.

Background

A. Congress Creates the Sentencing Commission & Guidelines
The Commission, created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 198412 as part of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,13 is an independent agency within the judicial branch
tasked with instituting “sentencing policies and practices14 for the federal criminal justice system

12

See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984); see 28 U.S.C. §§ 991–98 (2008).
Pub. L. No 98-473, Title II, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
14
See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006) (outlining duties of the Commission).
13

that will assure the ends of justice by promulgating detailed guidelines,15 and prescribing the
appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes.”16 The Commission includes
seven voting members (typically a combination of federal judges, federal prosecutors, and legal
scholars) and two ex officio non-voting members (including representatives from the parole
commission and the Attorney General).17 Importantly, Congress espoused three overarching
principles in creating the Commission: (1) combat crime honestly through an effective, fair system,
(2) introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing discrepancies in sentences
imposed for similar crimes committed by similar offenders, and (3) sentence proportionally in a
way that accounts for severity of offenses and repeat offenders.18 The circuit split on whether to
apply the general loss rule or the government benefits rule should be resolved to realign the
sentencing rules with Congress’s three guiding principles.

B. Calculating the Proper Guidelines Sentence under United States v. Booker
After an individual is convicted of a federal crime, federal courts apply the Guidelines to
determine the appropriate sentence and any potential restitution to be paid by the criminal.19
Section 2B1.1 of the Guidelines covers economic crimes including larceny, embezzlement, fraud,
forgery, and counterfeiting offenses.20 The Guidelines provide a sentencing structure for federal
courts while streamlining the mechanics of federal sentencing.21 In United States v. Booker, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Guidelines requirements are not mandatory, and
appellate courts must review federal sentences calculated under the Guidelines for

15

Id. § 994(a).
USSG §2B1.1(b)(1) ch.1, pt. A, subpt. 1–2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
17
Id. subpt. 1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016); see 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008).
18
USSG §2B1.1(b)(1) ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3, p.s.; see 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (2008).
19
USSG § 2B1.1 (2018); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
20
USSG § 2B1.1 (2018)
21
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. at 264; see USSG § 2B1.1 (2018).
16

unreasonableness.22 The process by which federal courts apply the Guidelines varies slightly
among the circuit courts of appeals;23 however, the Third Circuit’s three-step process serves as an
instructive example of how courts calculate an appropriate federal sentence in compliance with
Booker.24 In the Third Circuit, a district court calculates an appropriate sentence under Booker by
identifying the correct sentencing range under the Guidelines, considering departure motions from
the base offense level, and applying any variances that may justify an increase or decrease in an
individual’ sentence.25
In the Third Circuit, the three-step sentencing process begins with the District Court
properly calculating the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines.26 As mentioned above,
the Guidelines range functions as the starting point or the “Base Offense Level” for a court to begin
the sentencing calculation.27 Relevant to the analysis, “[t]he amount of loss that a defendant is
found to have caused largely drives the determination of [the] recommended sentencing range
under the Guidelines.”28 Second, after the court establishes the base offense level, the District

Booker, 543 U.S. at 261–63; see 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (stating that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence”).
23
See e.g., United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 374–77 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the District Court may use a
less rigid federal sentencing procedure to bypass a “minefield of tricky determinations” so long as the court arrives
at the correct Guidelines sentencing range and explicitly weighs the required §3553(a) factors); United States v.
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 454–458 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that the appropriate standard for calculating federal sentences
under the Guidelines post-Booker involves a four-step analysis where the District Court must (1) properly calculate
the sentencing range recommended by the Guidelines; (2) determine whether a sentence within that range and within
the statutory limitations serves the factors set forth in §3553(a), and, if not, select a sentence that does serve those
factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory limitations; and (4) articulate the reasons for selecting the particular
sentence, especially explaining why a sentence outside of the Guidelines range better serves the relevant sentencing
purposes set forth in §3553(a)).
24
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d. Cir. 2015); see United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 308 (3d Cir.
2011).
25
Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308.
26
See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179 (citing Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308).
27
See id.
28
Derick R. Vollrath, Note, Losing the Loss Calculation: Toward a More Just Sentencing Regime in White-Collar
Criminal Cases, 59 DUKE L.J. 1001, 1003 (2010) (discussing the importance of loss calculation in determining the
appropriate Guidelines range in white collar crime sentencing).
22

Court must consider departure motions.29 A departure motion allows the court to consider
“depart[ing] from the applicable guidelines range” when “there exists an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance . . .”30 Guideline departures, which must be carefully justified and explained by the
court, should only apply in “atypical case[s]” and the Guidelines enumerate reasons for adjusting
sentences upward or downward.31 Pertinent to fraud in the government contract context, a court
may find upward variations for harm to unaccounted for property or crimes that cause a
“significant disruption of a governmental function.”32 In the third and final step of the sentencing
analysis, the District Court must consider applying variances pursuant to the statutory factors
enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).33 Section 3553(a) obliges courts to impose sentences
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”34 Federal courts may consider (among other things)
the following factors in imposing a sentence: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense,”
(2) the need to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect of the law, and to provide

29

See USSG § 5K2.0(a)(1)(A) (prescribing departure process).
See id.; see also Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing step two of sentencing calculation process where departure
motions must be considered).
31
See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures and Variances 19 (2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting USSG n.55, ch.1, pt. A(4)(b)) (describing application of departures and
noting they should “only apply in the ‘atypical’ case lying outside the ‘heartland’ of conduct covered by the
guidelines”); see also id. at 4–40 (detailing overview of departures authorized by the Guidelines); see also Fumo,
655 F.3d at 308.
32
See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, Primer: Departures and Variances at 19–21
(quoting United States v. Cole, 357 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2004)). Under the Guidelines, “[i]f the offense caused
property damage or loss not taken into account within the [G]uidelines, the court may increase the sentence above
the authorized guideline range” in an amount “depend[ent] on the extent to which the harm was intended or
knowingly risked and on the extent to which the harm to property is more serious than other harm caused or risked
by the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction.”; USSG § 5K2.7. (stating “[i]f the defendant’s conduct resulted
in a significant disruption of a governmental function, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized
[G]uideline range to reflect the nature and extent of the disruption and the importance of the governmental function
affected”).
33
See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (explaining third step of sentencing process where “court [must] consider[] the
recommended Guidelines range together with statutory factors . . . and determine[] the appropriate sentence . . .”)
(internal citations omitted); see also id. at 317 (explaining the difference between departures and variances where
departures are deviations from the Guidelines range based on “reasons contemplated by the Guidelines themselves,”
while variances are deviations “based on an exercise of the court’s discretion under [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
34
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (instructing courts on appropriate factors to consider for imposing a sentence).
30

just punishment for the offense,” and (3) the need for deterrence.35 Overall, federal courts calculate
an appropriate sentence for financial crimes contained in section 2B1.1 by using the range
calculated in step one, adding or subtracting (via aggravating or mitigating factors) departures in
step two, and increasing or decreasing the range to reflect any applicable variances. 36
Section 2B1.1 Loss Rules Under the Guidelines That Apply to “Affirmative Action” Contract
Fraud.

As illustrated above, Guidelines section 2B1.1 prescribes offense level calculations for
economic crimes including fraud and deceit.37 Within section 2B1.1, subsection (A) provides the
base offense level and subsection (B) provides a detailed list of modifications for offense-specific
characteristics that can increase or decrease an offender’s base sentencing level based on various
aggravating and mitigating factors.38 In calculating loss, the Guidelines provide for baseline loss
and sentencing totals that are adjusted upward for loss where the offense level increases, the loss
increases in a directly proportional manner.39 The two most pertinent rules within section 2B1.1
for calculating sentencing totals for fraud in the “affirmative action” contract context include the
general loss rule and the special loss rules.40

a. The General Loss Rule in 3(A) & the Government Benefits Special Loss Rule in
3(F)(ii)
In cases involving government contract fraud, the general loss rule provides the starting
point for the sentencing analysis.41 The general loss rule applies to loss under subsection (b)(1)

35

Id. § 3553(a)(1)–(2) (detailing several relevant factors courts should consider in determining whether a variance
may be applicable in the DBE/8(a) “affirmative action” contract fraud context).
36
See Fumo, 655 F.3d at 308 (discussing a court’s responsibility at third step of the sentencing analysis).
37
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 179 (3d. Cir. 2015).
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016); see id. cmt. n.3(F).
41
Id. n.3(A).

and states that “loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss.”42 The Notes define “actual loss”
as “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.”43 Pecuniary harm
“means harm that is monetary or that otherwise is readily measurable in money.” 44 Intended loss
is defined as the pecuniary harm that offender sought to inflict. 45 In invoking the general loss rule
instead of the government benefits special rule, federal courts cite section 2B1.1 Note 3(A)(v)(II)
as the appropriate provision governing procurement fraud cases for fraud related to a defense
contract award.46 To that end, some judges would apply 3(A)(v)(II) regardless of the nature,
circumstances or purpose surrounding the defense contract award.47
The government benefits rule, a special rule under Note 3(F)(ii) that supplants the general
loss rule, applies in cases involving “government benefits” including fraud of grants, loans, and
entitlement program payments.48 In government benefits fraud cases, the Guidelines require that
“loss shall be considered to be not less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended
recipients or diverted from intended uses.”49 In short, if a court concludes that an offender’s fraud
included “government benefits,” the loss for sentencing purposes will be the entire total of the
grant or contract awarded without any mitigation for legitimate services rendered. 50 As shown
above, the decision as to whether to apply the general rule or the government benefits rule
implicates serious consequences for an individual’s aggregate sentence.51

b. Current Issues in Interpreting & Applying the Guideline Notes

42

Id. n.3(A).
Id. n.3(A)(i).
44
Id. n.3(A)(iii).
45
Id. n.3(A)(ii).
46
United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 183 (3d. Cir. 2015) (Hardiman, J., concurring)
47
Id.
48
USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii); see also id. n.3(A); see infra Part I.
43

Currently, varying interpretations as to whether an “affirmative action” government
contract program constitutes a “government benefit” and textual issues within the Guideline
comments continue to frustrate the goals Congress sought to achieve by creating the Commission.
As stated by Congress, the Commission’s goals and purpose is to “provide certainty and fairness”
in sentencing, “[avoid] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct,” maintain flexibility in sentencing
sufficient to “permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating and aggravating
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices,” and “reflect,
to the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process[.]”52 Presently, the conflict between Note 3(E)(i) and Note 3(F)(ii) and the current
comment’s language providing that 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subsection (A)” creates
problems with consistent statutory interpretation.53 Moreover, in cases involving SBA 8(a)
defense contract procurement fraud,54 courts may properly conclude that 3(A)(v)(II) applies in
cases of “procurement fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract award.”55 If 3(A)(v)(II)
applies, like 3(E)(ii), the general loss rule must be used for calculating sentence severity and
requires that the amount lost be mitigated so that loss is the greater of actual loss or intended loss,
not the full amount awarded under the contract.56
c. The “Affirmative Action” Government Programs at Issue: Well-Intentioned Programs
Exploited.
a. The Small Business Administration’s 8(a) Joint Venture Program

28 U.S.C. § 991(2008); see USSG ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 3 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016).
54
See id.
55
USSG §2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
56
See USSG § 2B1.1; Harris, 821 F.3d at 608.
52
53

The SBA, created under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958,57 exists to “ensure
small businesses [receive] a ‘fair proportion’ of government contracts.”58 Many fraud cases
involve the 8(a) Joint Venture Program, a federal program which allows an 8(a) firm that lacks the
capability to perform a contract on its own to enter into a joint venture agreement to perform the
contract.59 Specifically, the Section 8(a) Joint Venture Program authorizes the SBA to coordinate
fulfillment of federal procurement contracts through qualifying small businesses.60 Under the 8(a)
Joint Venture Program, participants can receive up to 4 million dollars for goods and services and
up to 6.5 million for manufacturing ventures.61 To qualify for 8(a) contracts, a small business
“must be owned and controlled by one or more ‘socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals.’”62 As such, the 8(a) program provides procurement opportunities by acting as an
“affirmative action” contracting program.63

SBA attempts to limit fraudulent joint venture

arrangements by warning that joint venture approval may be denied where an 8(a) firm brings its
8(a) status and substantively little else to the joint venture.64 SBA actively monitors for fraudulent
joint ventures and requires that 8(a) businesses perform at least 40% of the work,65 and the Joint
Venture Agreement must specify how the division of labor requirements will be met.66

57

Pub.L. No 85-699, Title I, § 102, 72 Stat. 689 (1958).
About the SBA: The Founding of the SBA, (2017), https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/history; see 15
U.S.C. § 631 (2010) (declaration of SBA policy); see also 15 U.S.C. § 661 (stating that the overall purpose and policy
of Small Business Investment Act of 1958 is to “improve and stimulate the national economy in general and the smallbusiness segment thereof in particular by establishing a program to stimulate and supplement the flow of private equity
capital and long-term loan funds which small-business concerns need for the sound financing of their business
operations and for their growth, expansion, and modernization, and which are not available in adequate supply”).
59
See 13 C.F.R §124.513 (2016).
60
15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(1)(A–B) (2016).
61
About the SBA: Benefits of the Program, (2017), https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/what-we-do/history.
62
15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4) (2016); id. § 637 (a)(1)(C).
63
See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2016).
64
13 C.F.R § 124.513(a)(2).
65
Id. § 124.513(d) (stating that the 40% labor division requirement became effective in March 2011 where prior to
that date, SBA regulations required that an 8(a) firm complete a “significant portion” of the contract work, but no
percentage was explicitly specified).
66
Id. § 124.513(c)(7).
58

Unfortunately, many “8(a) businesses” have stolen millions of dollars by misrepresenting its 8(a)
status, or by joining with a non-8(a) business as a matter of pretense only to have the non-8(a)
business complete most of the contract work and reap most of the award dollars.67
b. The Department of Transportation’s Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
Program
The DOT, which requires (under authority from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
that any state that receives federal transportation funds must set goals for participation in
transportation construction projects by disadvantaged68 business enterprises, remains susceptible
to fraud and abuse.69 Congress created the DBE program for recipients of federal transportation
funds.70 The DOT spends approximately fifty billion dollars annually on construction projects and
the government requires that roughly ten percent of its construction budget or five billion dollars
be allocated to qualifying DBEs.71 A DBE is a for-profit small business that “is at least 51% owned
by an individual or individuals who are both socially and economically disadvantaged72 and whose
management and daily operations are controlled by one or more of the disadvantaged individuals
who own it.73 Additionally, states must announce DBE participation goals and certify a business
as a DBE prior to contract bidding.74 To be considered a certified DBE, the DBE must “perform

67

See Rick Moran, SBA Inspector General Uncovers Fraud in the 8(a) Program, ASSOCIATION OF PROCUREMENT
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CENTERS (2017), http://www.aptac-us.org/news/sba-ig-uncovers-8a-fraud/.
68
49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014) (defining “socially and economically disadvantaged individuals” to include AfricanAmericans, Native Americans, Asian-Pacific Americans, Hispanic Americans, and women among other
classifications).
69
Id. § 26.21 (2014); see generally id. § 26(A–C).
70
Id. § 26.1–26.109 (2016); see also 23 U.S.C. § 324 (2012) (stating that no individual receiving federal assistance
may be discriminated against on the basis of gender under agency authority of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); see also George R. La Noue, Setting Goals in the Federal Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Programs, 17
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 423, 423 (2007) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 26.3); see also George R. La Noue, Western States’
Light: Restructuring the Federal Transportation Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program, 22 GEO. MASON. U.
C.R. L.J. 1, 3 (2011) (citing 49 § U.S.C. 31105(f) (2012)).
71
See McVicker, supra, at 4.
72
See Adarand, 528 U.S. at 261 (Stevens J., dissenting) (noting that minority and women subcontractors are
frequently subject to less traditional or obvious disadvantages “than direct, intentional racial prejudice”).
73
49 C.F.R. § 26.5 (2014).
74
Id. § 26.81.

[] a commercially useful function on [the] contract.75 Therefore, like SBA 8(a) requirements, a
DBE whose “role is limited to that of an extra participant in a transaction, contract, or project
through which funds are passed in order to obtain the appearance of DBE participation” does not
qualify for DBE participation.76 Regrettably, as with the SBA 8(a) program, the DOT’s DBE
program remains susceptible to fraud and abuse because individuals seeking lucrative government
contracts can creatively set up businesses and joint ventures that use one party’s DBE status as a
cover to receive federal dollars.77

III.

Current Circuit Court of Appeals Interpretation & Application of the Rules

In the absence of Supreme Court or Commission guidance on whether the general loss rule
or the government benefits rule applies to “affirmative action” contract fraud, the circuit courts of
appeals continue to reach contradictory conclusions endangering Congress’s goals of crafting the
Guidelines to create uniformity and fairness in federal sentencing nationwide. Indeed, two circuits
concluded that the general loss rule applies.78 Conversely, three circuits held that the government
benefits rule applies and voids any mitigation provisions in the general rule.79 Finally, the Third
Circuit in United States v. Nagle assumed that SBA and DBE programs should be considered
“government benefits”; however, the Third Circuit declined to resolve the issue definitively

75

Id. § 26.55(c)
Id. § (c)(2).
77
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/RCED-89-26, HIGHWAY CONTRACTING: ASSESSING FRAUD AND
ABUSE IN THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION’S DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE PROGRAM,
https://www.gao.gov/products/RCED-89-26 (finding that contractors paid over 1 million dollars to settle fraud
claims as a result of hundreds of DBEs being audited and investigated for fraud, abuse, and waste) (1989); see also
McVicker, supra, at 8–9 (stating the largest DBE fraud in United States history perpetrated by one recipient totaled
136 million dollars over 15 years and 18.7 million dollar fraud perpetrated by steel company using phone invoices).
78
Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 608 (5th Cir. 2016); Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2015).
79
Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009); Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006); Bros. Constr. Co., 219
F.3d 300, 321 (4th Cir. 2000).
76

because the court concluded that comment 3(E)(i) displaces 3(F)(ii) as currently written.80 Despite
the Third Circuit’s court’s refusal to conclude whether comment rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies to
DBE programs, the Court applied 3(E)(ii) to mitigate the defendant’s sentence.81 In sum, the Third
Circuit reached a legally sound conclusion given the Notes’ current statutory construction.
However, the case serves as a model for why the Notes require urgent reform given the billions of
taxpayer dollars that remain vulnerable.

Circuits That Apply the General Loss Rule to “Affirmative Action” Program Fraud Cases

In United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue of whether the general loss
rule or the government benefit rule applies in a fraud case involving the SBA’s 8(a) Joint Venture
Program.82 Harris, a retired Army Colonel who worked for a non-8(a) firm that performed largescale defense projects, created a joint venture with an 8(a) SBA approved business (Tropical and
Luster).83 Overall, the joint venture received three 8(a) contracts: first for $69,994, second for
$947,722 and third for $492,169 totaling $1,317,593.51.84

Harris defrauded the federal

government by joining with Tropical and Luster (approved 8(a) firms) to receive 8(a) status, but
Harris did not give either 8(a) qualified company a significant role in the planning or executing
process.85 In short, Harris flouted SBA 8(a) regulations (mentioned above) by paying Tropical
and Luster 51% of the project profits to “make everything look legitimate.”86 The District Court

80

803 F.3d 181–183 (3d. Cir. 2015).
Id.
82
821 F.3d at 592.
83
Id. at 592–93.
84
Id. at 594–602. (The District Court applied the government benefits rule and determined that an offense-level
increase of sixteen levels was appropriate after having calculated the loss amount as approximately $1.3 million. That
loss amount encompassed “the total amount awarded under both contracts,” “[n]ot including the payment
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found Harris guilty on all counts and he challenged the loss calculation that led to a two-level
adjustment for his role in the crime, a two-level adjustment for abusing a position of trust, and a
sixteen-level increase under section 2B1.1(a)(1).87 On appeal, Harris argued that the government
did not show harm to the procuring agencies because the Joint Venture performed all contracted
for services.88 Harris also argued that the loss amount totaled zero because neither the 8(a)
companies, nor the government suffered pecuniary harm.89 Finally, Harris argued that in the
alternative, the court “can look to the gain from the scheme, which is also zero.”90 In reply, the
government argued on appeal that contracts awarded under the 8(a) program are “government
benefits” and subject to the 3(F) special rule where the court should determine loss by adding the
face value of the contracts with no loss mitigation.91
The Fifth Circuit held that the 8(a) program did not constitute “government benefits” under
section 2B1.1 Note 3(F)(ii); therefore, defense contract loss should be calculated under the general
rule.92 The court determined that “the general rule . . . [applies] [i]n the case of a procurement
fraud, such as fraud affecting a defense contract award.”93 The court further stated that 8(a)
procurement contracts do not constitute “government benefits” because 3(F) only applies to grants,
loans, and entitlement program payments.94 To that end, although the enumerated list in 3(F) is
not necessarily exhaustive, the doctrine of noscitur a sociss canon95 requires that an enumerated
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list can only be expanded to entities sharing the common features of the enumerated examples.96
Moreover, the court reasoned that “while a government contract awarded under an affirmative
action program may be, in some sense, a ‘benefit,’ it does share any common features [of the
enumerated list]” and it is a bargained for exchange, not a unilateral transfer.97 Likewise, the court
was not persuaded by its sister circuits that concluded that the government benefits rule applies
because “the mere fact that a government contract furthers some public policy objective apart from
the government’s procurement needs is not enough to transform the contract into a ‘government
benefit’ akin to a grant or an entitlement payment program.”98 The Fifth Circuit concluded that
the loss amount should not be the total contract price (as under 3(F)), but rather the “contract price
less the fair market value of services rendered by the Joint Venture to the procuring agencies.”99
The court reasoned that calculating total loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1), 3(E)(i) requires that
“[l]oss shall be reduced by . . . the fair market value of the . . . services rendered.” 100 Note 3(E)(i)
applies broadly to all sections of section 2B1.1(b) including loss under the general rule.101 The
Fifth Circuit joined the Third and Ninth Circuits in concluding that if the Commission wanted
3(F)(ii) to apply to the general rule in 3(A), it would not have included rule 3(F)(v) requiring “loss
to be reduced by the fair market value of services rendered to the defendant.”102
In United States. v. Martin, the Ninth Circuit held that “the sentencing court [should] not
use the entire amount of government contract dollars awarded to defendant in calculating loss for
fraud cases involving the SBA 8(a) program or the state-administered DBE contracts.”103 Martin
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owned a construction company (“MarCon”) that focused on installing steel guardrails and concrete
barriers for public highways.104 Over a seven-year period (1999-2006), MarCon “received nearly
$20 million from 85 contracts awarded through the DBE program, and successfully performed
each contract.”105 MarCon also received three contracts worth nearly 3 million dollars from SBA
programs.106 The federal government caught Martin diverting profits made from the SBA and
DBE programs to accounts hidden from the IRS.107 By not reporting these profits, Martin avoided
paying over $100,000 in income taxes.108 At sentencing, Martin asserted that proper loss to the
government was zero given that MarCon fully performed on all contracts awarded to it.109 Yet,
the District Court found pecuniary harm and applied the “procurement fraud rule” (the same rule
as the Fifth Circuit applied) found in Note 3(A)(v)(II) of section 2B1.1.110 In reply, the government
argued that the court should apply 3(F)(ii) and conclude that the total loss amount equaled the total
value of the contracts totaling $22 million.111 The District Court held that “the government benefits
rule” applied; however, the court concluded that loss under the rule should be $3 million, the total
profits earned by Martin.112
First, the Ninth Circuit adopted Martin’s argument on appeal and held that the general rule
applies to affirmative action contracts under the 3(A)(v)(II) “procurement fraud rule.”113 As such,
the court stated that 3(E)(i) applied so that “[l]oss shall be reduced” by “the fair market value of .
. . the services rendered . . . by the defendant . . . to the victim before the offense was detected.”114
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Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit first concluded that the “procurement fraud rule” in
3(A)(v)(II) is the closest fit for this case because the rule’s “placement within application note
3(A), rather than in note 3(F) with the special rules, indicates that procurement fraud cases fall
under the general rule for calculating actual and intended loss.”115 Second, the Ninth Circuit held
that the “government benefits rule” did not apply because the 3(F) special rules apply
“[n]otwithstanding the general rules of application note 3(A).”116
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applied because although “an
‘exclusive opportunity’ might be a benefit in some sense, . . . the Guidelines’ focus on pecuniary
harm” suggest that comment 3(F)(ii) deals exclusively with unilateral government assistance such
as food stamps, not fee-for-service business deals.117 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the
general rule applied because statutory interpretation requires that when interpreting examples in
an enumerated list, all terms must include similar characteristics to the enumerated list.118 The
court further reasoned that if applying basic rules of statutory interpretation fails to illuminate the
correct result, the rule of lenity compels an interpretation in favor of the defendant.119 The rule of
lenity in statutory interpretation dictates that where Congress’s intent remains ambiguous and
reasonable minds may defer as to its intent, courts should adopt the less harsh interpretation of the
Guidelines punishment.120 Despite concluding that the 3(A) general loss rules applied, the court
noted that “DBE and SBA programs are designed to benefit disadvantaged businesses.”121 The
court stated “[i]t is conceivable that the government paid a premium contract price”; however, any
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difference between what the government paid versus the normal contract price is the actual loss.122
Finally, the court conceded that there may be non-pecuniary losses to the government in that
Martin’s fraud may have harmed the integrity of the programs and cheated law abiding DBEs out
of potential contracts.123 Nevertheless, the court concluded that non-pecuniary loss may be
properly assessed by the District Court in applying the Guidelines under the correct rule.124
In conclusion, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits applied the general loss rule to “affirmative
action” contract procurement fraud finding that either Note 3(E)(i) supersedes 3(F) in the defense
contract fraud context or the “[n]otwithstanding the general rules of application note 3(A)”
language precluded the application of the government benefits special rule in 3(F)(ii).125 Both
circuits concluded that 3(F)(ii) did not apply by relying on general principals of statutory
interpretation,126 despite conceding that the government “likely” paid a premium for the
“affirmative action” contracts and tacitly acknowledging that such contracts remain unique in the
federal contracting scheme.127
Circuits That Apply the Government Benefits Special Loss Rule to “Affirmative Action” Program
Fraud Cases

In United States v. Brothers Construction Co., the Fourth Circuit held that the government
benefits special rule applies in fraud case involving a state-administered DBE program.128 In 1994,
the West Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (“WVDOH”) solicited
bids for a $5 million DBE project.129 Two business partners (Tri-State) contracted with Brothers
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Construction (a certified DBE) to work on a local highway project. After winning the DBE
contract, no Brothers employees appeared on the jobsite at any point during the construction.130
The District Court convicted Tri-State and Brothers of defrauding the government by scheming to
divert DBE funds to a non-DBE business.131 Brothers and Tri-State argued that the sentencing
court erred in concluding that under section 2F1.1. Note 7(d), “[i]n a case involving diversion of
government program benefits, loss is the value of benefits diverted from intended recipients or
uses.”132 Brothers and Tri-State further argued that loss to the government was zero133 because all
contracts were performed by other certified DBEs.134 Thus, defendants argued that the project
received required DBE performance and the WVDOH received what it bargained for. 135 In
conclusion, the Fourth Circuit applied the now nonexistent section 2F1.1. Note 7(d) government
benefits rule to the DBE fraud without explanation.136
In United States v. Leahy, the Seventh Circuit held that a city ordinance meant to direct
contracts to minority (MBEs) and women-owned businesses (WBEs) constituted an “affirmative
action” program under Note 8(d) (the current 3(F)), which required sentencing to be based on the
total contract dollars awarded with no mitigation for services rendered.137 The ordinance, like the
DBE requirements, required that an MBE or minority group must own 51% of the company and
one or more minority members must be involved in day-to-day management.138 After Chicago
passed the ordinance, James Duff set up a business with his mother (Green Duff) to qualify for

130

Id. at 306.
Id. at 318.
132
Id. at 317.
133
Bros. Constr. Co., 219 F.3d at 308 (The District Court did not impose a fine on Brothers Construction Co. because
the company was insolvent).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 318.
136
Id. at 317.
137
464 F.3d 773, 800 (7th Cir. 2006).
138
Id. at 779.
131

WBE status.139 An investigation revealed that Green Duff technically owned all the company
stock, but had no real involvement with the business’s management.140 During the fraud scheme,
defendants received over $100 million dollars in state and federal grants.141 Defendants argued on
appeal that “the only loss Chicago suffered was to its regulatory interests—and intangible right
unprotected by these statutes” at issue.142 In the alternative, the defendants argued that the Note
governing contract procurement applied, not the government benefits rule.143 Both parties agreed
that Guidelines 2F1.1 applied to this case.144

Yet, the District Court determined that the

appropriate loss number should total the amount of profits145 gained, not the entire contract dollars
awarded.146 The Seventh Circuit, citing a former city official’s testimony,147 concluded that the
Chicago city ordinance at issue was “an affirmative action program whose fruits were reserved for
fledgling minority and women businesses.”148
Specifically, the Seventh Circuit affirmed that the government benefit rules applied
because “the goal of Chicago’s program was fundamentally frustrated, . . . ‘it [was] a double loss,
the loss that we computed and the real loss to all people that [did not] get this business, that [did
not] get a chance to become [a] successful [MBE] or [WBE], because this huge amount was
diverted.’”149 The court held that the government benefits rule applies, not the general loss rule
because the ordinance states, “[a]n effect to direct contracts to [MBEs] and [WBEs] is required to
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eradicate the effects of discrimination.”150 Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that “the correct amount
under application note 8(d) is the value of the benefits diverted, which was over $100 million.”151
In United States v. Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit held that special rule 3(F)(ii) applies
because “CSBE and DBE programs are government benefits programs under § 2B1.1 of the
[Guidelines].”152 A Florida grand jury indicted Maxwell on twenty-four counts of mail fraud, wire
fraud, money laundering, and other conspiracy charges.153 At issue were six contracts funded by
Miami Dade County (the “County”) that required compliance with the County’s Community Small
Businesses Enterprise (“CSBE”).154 To receive a CSBE contract, the CSBE must “perform a
commercially useful function in the completion of the contract.”155 A CSBE performs a
“commercially useful function” when it “actually performs, manages, and supervises the work
involved.”156 Overall, the CSBE contracts at issue involved the same requirements as the federal
DBE contracts previously discussed.157 Once the local government approves CSBE status, the
contractor must submit a Schedule of Participation and Monthly Utilization Reports to certify
compliance with CSBE and DBE work requirements.158 At sentencing, Maxwell objected to the
court’s total calculated loss at $7 million because “he was not personally awarded the contracts,
he did not benefit from the contracts, and Fisk (his non- CSBE business partner who did all the
work and remitted payment to the certified CSBE) made only a small profit on the contracts.”159
On appeal, Maxwell challenged the District Court’s loss amount calculation under section 2B1.1
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of the Guidelines.160 The government requested a total loss amount of $7,974,674 or the total
amount of all CSBE and DBE contracts awarded.161 The District Court concluded that total loss
was six percent of the total contracts awarded because six percent was the average profit margin
on government electrical subcontracts.162
The Eleventh Circuit held that the DBE and similar programs are “government benefits”
that fall under the special rules.163 The court reasoned that “DBE and similar program[s] aimed at
giving exclusive opportunities to women and minority businesses” makes them entitlement
payments (one of the enumerated examples in 3(F)(ii)).164 Unlike standard construction contracts,
“these contracts focus mainly on who is doing the work.”165 Therefore, applying 3(F)(ii), the
“appropriate amount of loss here should have been the entire value of the CSBE and SBE contracts
that were diverted to the unintended recipient.”166
In United States v. Nagle, the Third Circuit held that under the standard Guideline’s
definition of loss, defendants were liable for the total value of DBE contracts minus services and
performance on the contracts.167 Nagle and Fink owned a non-DBE manufacturing and contracting
business.168 Later, the business created a joint venture with a company owned by a Filipino man
who worked on various DBE transportation projects.169 If the minority business won a DBE
contract,170 Nagle and Fink’s business would perform all the work on the contract.171 The District

160

Id. at 1305.
Id.
162
Id.
163
Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1306.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
803 F.3d 167, 168 (3d. Cir. 2015).
168
Id. at 171.
169
Id.
170
49 C.F.R. § 26.21–.81 (2014); see Definition of a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise, (2017),
https://www.transportation.gov/civil-rights/disadvantaged-business-enterprise/definition-disadvantaged-businessenterprise.
171
Nagle, 803 F.3d at 171.
161

Court concluded that under section 2B1.1., the defendants owed the face value of the contracts
without mitigation for work performed.172 Defendants argued that the District Court should have
used Note 3(A) to calculate loss instead of 3(F)(ii) because “the DBE program is not a ‘government
benefit’ and, therefore, whether not they should receive a credit for completing the
subcontracts.”173 In the alternative, defendants claimed that “they are nonetheless entitled to credit
under Note 3(F)(ii).174 In reply, the government asserted that the 3(F) “government benefits rule”
applied making loss the total face value of the contracts.175 Importantly, the Third Circuit declined
to conclude whether a DBE contract is a “government benefit” because regardless as to whether
3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies, the court held that defendants owed the full value of the contracts with
credit for fair market value of services provided.176
The Third Circuit concluded that the general loss rule applies under 3(A) and 3(F) as
currently drafted.177 If the 3(A) standard analysis applies, loss defendants must pay back includes
the total contract value minus the fair market value of performance and raw materials provided.178
Regarding whether the 3(F)(ii) applied, the court concluded that “the Government’s position [was]
persuasive particularly in light of the goals of the DBE program,” who the program focuses on,
and the emphasis on benefitting those who perform the work.179 Furthermore, the court hinted that
the special rule could apply because “[the DBE program] assumes that performance of a contract
allows a DBE to not only earn a profit on the deal but also to form connections with suppliers,
labor, and others in the industry.”180 Importantly, therefore, the profit earned, is “not the only
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benefit the DBE obtains when it receives the contract.

Accordingly, when [the parties]

fraudulently received the [DBE contracts], the DBE program assumed that all of the contract price
was going towards benefiting a true DBE.”181 The court concluded that if Note 3(F)(ii) applies,
the proper loss amount is the total face value of the contracts.182
Overall, even if 3(F)(ii) applies, 3(E)(i) overrides 3(F)(ii) based on the current comment
text.183 Despite assuming that DBE contracts constitute “government benefits,” the Third Circuit
held that “Note 3(E)(i) requires a credit against the full face value of the contracts [regardless as
whether 3(A) or 3(F)] applies.]”184 Here, Note 3(E)(i) requires that “the fair market value of the
property returned and services rendered, by . . . the defendant [] shall be credited against the
loss.”185 In reply to 3(E)(i), the government argued that defendants are not entitled to credit because
“as non-DBEs they did not ‘render any valuable services’” and 3(E)(i) does not apply to 3(F)(ii).186
The court decided that 3(E)(i) applied to 3(F)(ii) for two reasons: the 3(F) special rules apply
“[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A),” and 3(F)(v)(II) states that “loss shall include the amount paid
for the property, services or goods transferred, rendered or misrepresented, with no credit for
provided for the value of those items or services.”187 Notably, the court stated that “[h]ad the
[Commission] intended to preclude crediting services render against loss for Note 3(F)(ii), it would
have used similar language is it used in Note 3(F)(v)(II).188 In conclusion, the Third Circuit held
that 3(E)(i) and 3(F)(ii) function together and require mitigation of the total central regardless of
which rule applies.189
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Judge Hardiman, concurring in United States v. Nagle, concluded that DBE fraud loss
calculation should invoke Note 3(A), not as a government benefit under the special rule.190 Judge
Hardiman reasoned that defendants “committed classic procurement fraud” by lying about
“compliance with federal regulations in order to receive contracts that would have otherwise gone
to others.”191 Furthermore, the Guidelines clearly state that the 3(A) general rule applies to fraud
procurement and 3(A)(v)(II) dictates how 3(A) should be applied in such cases.192 Therefore,
3(F)(ii) should apply only in fraudulent receipt of welfare payments and has “no place in a
procurement fraud case.”193 The current circuit split involving whether rule 3(A) or 3(F)(ii) applies
to fraud in the SBA and DBE programs continues to divide courts and frustrate Congress’s goals
in creating the Guidelines Notes; therefore, Note 2B1.1. should be amended to provide fairness,
continuity and notice to all defendants that defrauding the government will be met with a severe,
predictable punishment formula.

IV.

Implications & Analysis
Billions of dollars remain at risk. Consequently, the current circuit split implicates

tremendous urgency in the need for federal sentencing reform in “affirmative action” government
contracts. To address the current circuit split, the Commission should revise the Notes to ensure
that criminals who illegally exploit government programs can be held accountable for the full
amount of money awarded by the government regardless of the benefits or services provided.

The Origin of the Problem: A Significant Change to the Guidelines Within the Last Decade Creates
the Need for Urgent Reform to Clarify Federal Sentencing Rules and to Return to Congress’s
Original Goals of Maintaining Uniformity and Fairness in Federal Sentencing.
190
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The Supreme Court held “[t]he Guidelines Manual's commentary which interprets or
explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.”194 Moreover, the “[G]uidelines
commentary, interpreting or explaining the application of a guideline, is binding on [the Court]
when we are applying that [G]uidelines because we are obligated to adhere to the Commission’s
definition.”195 Significantly, in 2001, the Commission merged the government benefits special rule
under section 2F1.1 into section 2B1.1.196 Based on the now nonexistent section 2F1.1, the Fourth,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits held that SBA and DBE programs should be considered
government benefit programs.197 Specifically, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits based their
decisions on the 1997 and 1998 Guidelines under the former section 2F1.1, which did not require
that loss be reduced by fair market value of services rendered akin to current rule 3(E)(i). 198 The
Commission later consolidated section 2F1.1 with section 2B1.1 in the 2001 Guidelines.199 The
Guidelines rule change was noteworthy because the old rule 2F1.1 contained a provision similar
to current rule 3(F)(ii) (which both courts relied on), but no rule allowing loss mitigation
resembling 3(E)(i).200 If the Comments cannot be amended, the Supreme Court should hold that
“affirmative action” contract programs are “government benefit” programs to reconcile decisions
made under the old rules with the new rules.
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Re-Evaluating United States v. Harris: The “Government Benefits” Special Rule and
Congressional Intent Weakened

If the Fifth Circuit properly interpreted the Guidelines under the noscitur a sociss doctrine,
the court should have applied the government benefits special rule to calculate loss instead of the
general loss rule. The noscitur a sociss doctrine, Latin for “it is known by the company that it
keeps,” is a concept frequently employed in interpreting statutory construction.201 The Fifth Circuit
held that the general loss rule applied and that the noscitur a sociss doctrine precluded 8(a)
programs from being read into the enumerated examples listed in 3(F)(ii).202 Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit erred in applying the general loss rule for three reasons.
First, the Fifth Circuit’s previous application of the government benefits rule in United
States v. Dowl on similar facts undermines its decision in United States v. Harris. In United States
v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit cited four types of programs that it previously applied the government
benefits rule for sentencing.203 Specifically, the court previously applied the 3(F)(ii) government
benefits special rule in cases involving: EPA grants,204 SBA loans,205 FEMA disaster relief
reimbursements,206 and Medicare reimbursements.207 In United States. v. Dowl,208 the Fifth Circuit
held that the government benefits rule applied when the “[Defendant] submitted fraudulent
applications [with the SBA’s disaster assistance loan program] to obtain government funds later
spent inappropriately.209 The court applied the government benefits special rule in 3(F)(ii) because
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the defendant’s scheme deprived the government of the funds’ economic value for aiding
homeowner[s's] rebuilding efforts after Hurricane Katrina.”210 While the disaster assistance loan
in Dowl did not reserve funds for a racial minority or women, the court noted (similar to 8(a) fraud)
that the scheme diverted government money from the intended recipients to the defendant.211
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit in Harris, like Dowd, should have applied the government benefits
special rule because in each case, the defendant diverted funds reserved for a government specified
recipient to an unintended recipient causing the government a double-loss.212
Second, in United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit erred in relying on the noscitur a sociss
doctrine when it concluded that the SBA 8(a) Joint Venture program did not share common
features with the 3(F)(ii) enumerated list because defense contracts require a “bargained for
exchange” and a mutual transfer of benefits.213 Indeed, the court acknowledged that an “affirmative
action” contract program may benefit the recipient; however, the court stated that the three
examples in 3(F)(ii) involve “a unilateral transfer,” not a “bargained for exchange.”214 The court,
invoking the noscitur a sociss doctrine, ultimately held that the government benefits rule did not
apply because “unlike the enumerated examples, . . . contracts awarded under the 8(a) program do
not exist primarily to benefit the awardee, . . . such contracts first and foremost serve the
government’s own procurement needs.”215 The reality remains just the opposite. 8(a)’s purpose
indirectly allows the government to fulfill its procurement needs; yet, Congress expressly instituted
8(a) and DBE programs to benefit the awardee directly by providing minorities and women a fair
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chance in the marketplace where minorities historically retained no opportunities or in some cases
where minorities and women continue to realize stifled business opportunity.216
Third, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the 3(A) general rule applies to “affirmative action
contracts” because they neither involve traditional consideration, nor the bargaining context of
private contracts overlooks the nature of how individuals receive such contracts.217 Unlike
traditional contracts that require consideration to be valid, a business can receive 8(a) contracts by
simply filling out a form with basic information, the job to be completed, and certification that the
business complied with the statute’s SBA minority work requirements.218 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit
conceded and Congress explicitly provided that 8(a) Joint Venture contracts may “won through
competition”219 or non-competitively on a “sole source”220 basis.221 As a result, contrary to the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis, 8(a) and DBE contracts frequently involve a unilateral transfer of public
taxpayer money to an applicant without traditional contract negotiations or legal consideration
similar to EPA grants, SBA loans, FEMA disaster relief reimbursements, and Medicare
reimbursement. Moreover, in contrast with United States v. Harris, the Fifth Circuit in United
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States v. Lopez previously held that defrauding a federal contract program [the Javits-WagnerO’Day Act or “JWOD”] designed to employ blind and disabled individuals constituted a loss under
the government benefits rule.222 In Lopez, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the government benefits
rule applied when Lopez directed only nine percent of the contract award to the intended disabled
or blind recipients.223 Although, Lopez did not involve racial based affirmative action goals, the
court held that the government benefits rule nevertheless applied because “[t]he focus in the JWOD
program is on providing employment opportunities for the severely disabled, not on the specific
product or service provided.”224 The government benefits special rule in the 3(F)(ii) list states that
the rule applies to “(e.g., grants, loans, entitlement program payments).”225 As stated above and
contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, 8(a) and DBE programs could be reconciled with the
noscitur a sociss doctrine and be identified as unilateral grants or “program payments” due to the
unilateral nature of procurement procedures, the lack of consideration exchanged between parties,
and the bargaining dynamics involved. Therefore, if a federal contract program to specifically
benefit the disabled constitutes a “government benefit,” the 8(a) program should have been deemed
such as well. In conclusion, given the holdings in Lopez and Dowl, and Congress’s explicit intent
in creating the SBA and DBE programs, the government benefits special rule enumerated example
list should be construed broadly to include SBA 8(a) and DBE programs.
Applying the Government Benefits Special Loss Rules for Defrauding “Affirmative Action”
Government Contracts Will Promote Fairness, Re-Invigorate Congress’s Public Policy Goals,
Deter Potential White Collar Criminals, and Send a Strong Message to the Public That Stealing
from the Government and Disadvantaged Businesses Will Not Be Condoned.
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In the interests of public policy and fairness, the Commission should amend the Notes to
ensure that defrauding an “affirmative action” government programs results in a loss equal to the
entire contract award without mitigation. Specifically, the public policy purposes for 3(F)(ii), to
ensure maximum punishment for stealing from the government and taxpayers, should not be
circumvented or frustrated by Note 3(E)(i) or Note 3(F)(v)(II) as currently written. To remedy the
situation, the Commission should revise the sentencing rules to ensure that criminals who illegally
exploit government programs can be held accountable for the full amount of money awarded by
the government regardless of any benefits or services provided. Moreover, “affirmative action”
contract programs should be considered “government benefits” because Congress created such
programs to espouse a government policy favoring socially disadvantaged individuals in the
marketplace.226 Finally, Congress explicitly created the Commission to “combat crime honestly
through an effective, fair system.”227 To realize Congress’s goals, fairness demands that anyone
who defrauds a government “affirmative action” program should be sentenced under 3(F)(ii) to
guarantee that loss will be the entire contract total awarded just as if the criminal defrauded
Medicare, the EPA, or welfare benefits.
“Affirmative action” contract programs should also be considered “government benefits”
to strengthen and reassert deterrence interests in federal sentencing. The theory of deterrence in
criminal law relies on the assumption that fear of punishment will influence potential criminals to
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not break the law.228 To increase deterrence, the Commission should amend the Guidelines’ text
for calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule
under 3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating
that special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A).”229 Amending the Notes in this manner
will standardize and deter individuals that defraud government “affirmative action” programs
regardless as to whether a business fully performs a contract. The Notes should be reformed
because a federal court’s ability to mitigate loss under 3(F)(v)(II) or 3(E)(i) undermines the
deterrence role and the recognition of non-pecuniary loss envisioned by the drafters of 3(F)(ii). To
that end, Congress created the Commission to “introduce reasonable uniformity in sentencing by
narrowing discrepancies in sentences imposed for similar crimes committed by similar
offenders.”230 Uniformity, where courts treat all individuals similarly and fair notice, where all
individuals know that they will receive a harsher penalty for a given offense, increases
deterrence.231 Consequently, the existing circuit split on the issue of “affirmative action”
government programs undermines the benefits of deterrence provided by uniform sentencing and
the goals set forth by Congress in creating the Commission and the Guidelines.232 In the context
of economic crimes, the symbolism of higher prison terms “is important [in deterring white collar
crime or contract procurement fraud] because the strongest possible message should be sent to
those who would engage in similar conduct that they will be caught and punished to the full extent
of the law.”233
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The Notes should also be amended to address specific deterrence and general deterrence to
maximize the deterrent effect on individuals that may consider stealing from the SBA and DBE
programs.234 Critically, amending the Notes will deter federal courts from “succumbing to the
impulse to see [white collar defendants] in the warm light of a contrite individual who engaged in
aberrational conduct but is unlikely to offend again.”235 In the alternative, even if higher sentences
do not reduce fraud crime directly, greater prison time may “deter judges from going to one
extreme or the other” . . . because higher sentencing “requires consideration of the impact on
society and not solely the particular offender.”236 Furthermore, higher standardized punishments
will promote deterrence in sentencing of “affirmative action” contracts because fraud in such cases
involves substantial non-pecuniary loss to amorphous victims.237 Therefore, to achieve maximum
deterrence, the Commission should amend the Guidelines to vindicate non-pecuniary loss to the
government, taxpayers and “amorphous victims” including the small business contract
procurement market.238 In government fraud cases, many defendants plead that there is no loss to
the government or society because the defendants performed all contractual obligations. 239 To
eliminate such defenses, defendants should be liable for the full price of a contract award because
“[i]t is conceivable that the government paid a premium contract price above what it would pay
for other contracts under normal competitive bidding procedures.”240 Therefore, the amended
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Guidelines should recognize that loss to the government includes a double loss: the loss to
taxpayers and the excess funds the government paid to a DBE or 8(a) business to realize Congress’s
policy goals of aiding minority and women owned businesses.241
Public policy further demands that defendants be responsible for the entire contract award
because “[defendant’s] fraud harmed the integrity of the [8(a) and DBE] programs, which were
designed to help legitimately disadvantaged businesses. There may also be harm . . . to legitimate
program participants whose businesses might have received the contracts that were awarded to
[defendant].”242 The government should be reimbursed fully for the traditional loss as well as the
latent loss to allow the recouped funds to flow back into government coffers with the goal of aiding
legitimate, law abiding minority applicants. Principally, reform will aid the market writ large and
other “amorphous victims” affected by white collar contract fraud.243 As the Guidelines recognize
that “there may be cases in which the offense level determined under [section 2B1.1] substantially
understates the seriousness of the offense,” the Notes should be reformed to account for the
invisible, non-pecuniary loss involved in fraud of SBA and DBE programs.244 Further examples
of non-pecuniary loss caused by DBE program fraud include discouraging potential legitimate
disadvantaged businesses from entering the DBE program and preventing actual recognized DBEs
from graduating from the program.245 In sum, the Commission should amend the Guidelines for
calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule under
3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating that
special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A)”246 to standardize and deter individuals that
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defraud government “affirmative action” programs regardless as to whether a business fully
performs a contract.

The Way Forward: Preventing the Nagle Outcome Through Reasonable Reform

United States v. Nagle embodies the model case study to examine how the Guidelines
remain fundamentally flawed without reform. Based on the current text, the Third Circuit
reasonably interpreted the Notes in applying 3(A)(v)(II) and 3(E)(i) instead of 3(F)(ii) to
“affirmative action” contract fraud.247

Regrettably, the Third Circuit’s decision “weakened

prosecutor’s chances of successfully seeking [longer] prison sentences when the court allowed
offsetting for contractual performance . . . in calculating . . . ‘loss.’”248 An examination of United
States v. Nagle reveals three current textual issues that undermine the purpose of 3(F)(ii). First,
3(F) currently states “Special Rules- “Notwithstanding subdivision (A).”249

This provision

undercuts special rule 3(F)(ii) by providing that the government benefits special rule only
supersedes the subsection (A) general loss rule. Second, several circuit courts mitigated loss using
3(F)(v) (covering misrepresentation schemes) or using 3(A)(v)(II) (involving fraud of defense
contracts).250 Because many SBA 8(a) and DBE fraud cases involve Defense Department
contracts, the general rule in 3(A) robs 3(F)(ii) of its purpose. Given that “affirmative action”
contracts remain dissimilar to traditional contracts, there is no rational reason why defense
contracts under 8(a) or the DBE should be treated differently than all other 8(a)/DBE construction
and transportation contracts. Third, several circuits251 reasonably concluded that mitigating rule
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3(E)(i) “Credits Against Loss” note applies to reduce a criminal’s total “loss.”252 Despite the Third
Circuit assuming that DBE contracts constituted government benefits regardless as to whether
3(A) or 3(F) applies, the court held that defendants owed the full value of the contracts with credit
for fair market value of services provided under section 3(E)(i).253 As a result, section 3(E)(i) and
the current “[n]otwithstanding Subsection A” language frustrates the goals of 3(F)(ii) even if, as
in Nagle, the court assumes that the DBE program constitutes a “government benefit.”254 Thus, to
resolve the textual issues in the Notes, the Commission should amend the Guidelines for
calculating loss under section 2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule under
3(F)(ii) applies “notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating that
special rules apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A).”255 Amending the Notes in this manner will
clearly indicate that the 3(E)(i) “Credits Against Loss” provision does not supersede the 3F special
rules. As a result, any federal court that concludes that SBA 8(a) and DBE programs constitute
government benefits programs will be bound to apply the 3(F)(ii) special loss rules in lieu of the
general loss rule in sub-section (A). Requiring the application of 3(F)(ii) will ensure that a criminal
who steals from any “affirmative action” program will be responsible for the full contract price
awarded without mitigation for any legitimate services rendered.256

V.

Conclusion
The Commission should amend the Guidelines for calculating loss under section

2B1.1(b)(1) to clarify that the government benefits special rule under 3(F)(ii) applies
“notwithstanding subdivisions (A–E)” instead of the current language stating that special rules
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apply “notwithstanding subdivision (A).”257 With differing circuit interpretations on how to apply
the Notes, it is imperative for the Commission to amend the Notes to ensure that the government
benefits rule applies to all SBA and DBE affirmative action programs. The lack of clarity regarding
which rules apply to “affirmative action” contracts continues to exacerbate the discrepancies in
sentencing, while eroding the benefits of such programs to the individuals who rightfully deserve
financial help in their businesses. Until the Commission amends the Notes, the Supreme Court
should hold that SBA 8(a) and DBE programs comprise government benefits to provide guidance
and certainty in federal sentencing for white collar crimes.
This comment scrutinizes the background of the Commission, the relevant rules at issue
and the various circuit court cases that resolved the issue. Likewise, this comment offers a feasible
solution to revive the principle that defrauding government benefits consistently comes with a
steep price. Although opponents may suggest that Congress intended to create flexible guidelines
for federal courts, a district court imbued with too much sentencing discretion will ultimately lead
to injustice, diluted deterrence, and disparate outcomes across the nation. In conclusion, this
comment proposes reasonable solutions to re-calibrate federal sentencing with Congress’s original
goals and give fair notice to offenders that they will be liable for everything they steal from the
people.
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